图书简介

Mechanism design and imperfect information.- Observable Perfect Equilibrium.- Playing Repeated Coopetitive Polymatrix Games with Small Manipulation Cost.- Rule Enforcing Through Ordering.- Security Games.- Multi-defender Security Games with Schedules.- Asymmetric Centrality Game against Network Epidemic Propagation.- Shades of Grey: Strategic Bimatrix Stopping Games for Modelling (Un)Ethical Hacking Roles.- Learning in security games.- Characterizing and Improving the Robustness of Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworks.- Quantisation Effects in Adversarial Cyber-Physical GamesTakuma Adams.- Scalable Learning of Intrusion Responses through Recursive Decomposition.- Cyber deception.- Honeypot Allocation for Cyber Deception in Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach.- Optimal Resource Allocation for Proactive Defense with Deception in Probabilistic Attack Graphs.- The Credential is Not Enough: Combining Honeypots and Fake Credentials for Cyber-Defense.- Economics of security.- Does Cyber-insurance Benefit the Insured or the Attacker? -- A Game of Cyber-Insurance.- Rational Broadcast Protocols against Timid Adversaries.- FlipPath Game to Counter Stealthy Attacks in SDN-based Tactical Networks.- Information and privacy.- Double-sided Information Asymmetry in Double Extortion Ransomware.- Opacity-enforcing active perception and control against eavesdropping attacks.- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Auditing Differentially Private Algorithms with Epistemically Disparate Herd.- Modeling and Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game with Mixed Armament.- Short articles.- Incentive-Based Software Security: Fair Micro-Payments for Writing Secure Code.- Using Game Theory Approach for COVID-19 Risk Analysis and Medical Resource Allocation.- Shapley Value to Rank Vulnerabilities on Attack Graphs: Applications to Cyberdeception.- Solving security models with perfect observability.

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