图书简介
This book is based on the author’s published research and uses the principal-agent methodology as a consistent framework for analysing and evaluating the development of the European Union’s agricultural land use policy as it has evolved over the last two decades from voluntary set-aside to "compliance" set-aside to environmental stewardship. The book begins with an introduction to the principal-agent methodology and to the historical development of agricultural land use policy in the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). There are also literature-based introductions which contextualise each major part of the book (Parts A and B). The book concludes with some reflections and forward-looking comments on policy design lessons from this research, which will be of use to students, academics and policymakers.
Key Features:
○ Identifies and quantifies farmer impacts and environmental benefits from policies which take agricultural land out of production
○ Evaluates the consequences of previous and existing agri-environmental policies, both as aspects of agricultural land use policy in the CAP
○ Discusses the asymmetric information problem and shows how principal-agent theory can be applied in the context of EU agricultural land use policy
Introduction; Set-Aside as an Agricultural Land Use Policy in the European Union: ’Nice Work If You Can Get It’: An Analysis of Optimal Set-Aside; Set-Aside Premiums and the May 1992 CAP Reforms; Participation in Set-Aside: What Determines the Opting in Price?; The Impact of Price Support on Set Aside Responses to an Increase in Price Uncertainty; Land Heterogeneity and the Effectiveness of CAP Set-Aside; An Assessment of the Impact of Implementing the European Commission’s Agenda 2000 Cereal Proposals for Specialist Wheatgrowers in Denmark; Using Principal-Agent Theory to Deal with Output Slippage in the European Union Set-Aside Policy; Environmental Stewardship as an Agricultural Land Use Policy in the European Union: Moral Hazard and Risk Management in Agri-Environmental Policy; On the Use of Targeting to Reduce Moral Hazard in Agri-Environmental Schemes; Land Heterogeneity, Agricultural Income Foregone and Environmental Benefit: An Assessment of Incentive Compatibility Problems in Environmental Stewardship Schemes; Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Does the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme Design Reduce Adverse Selection?; Farmer Compensation and Its Consequences for Environmental Benefit Provision in the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme; Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri-Environmental Policy; Price Insurance, Moral Hazard and Agri-Environmental Policy; To Cheat or Not to Cheat: Moral Hazard and Agri-Environmental Policy; Reflections, Looking Around and L ooking Ahead.
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